President Xi Jinping first proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022 at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia. The proposal was subsequently elaborated into a concept paper in 2023. The document positions China as a responsible major power committed to multilateralism and reforming global security governance. It outlines six core principles, including the pursuit of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity; adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; recognition of countries’ legitimate security concerns; the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and consultation; and an emphasis on both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. While the principles largely reiterate China’s longstanding foreign policy, they also reflect China’s broader effort to challenge Western-led, alliance-based security frameworks and its aspiration to shape global security governance in a more China-centric world order.

With respect to Nepal’s stance on the GSI, there is a clear narrative divergence between the two countries. In August 2025, following former Prime Minister Oli's visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China claimed that Nepal supported the GSI. Nepal, however,  has repeatedly clarified that it has neither supported nor joined the initiative. Since Article 51 of the Constitution of Nepal explicitly states that the principles of non-alignment and Panchsheel shall guide Nepal’s foreign policy, Nepal remains cautious of initiatives carrying security or military connotations.

However, a closer examination of Nepal–China engagement suggests that the absence of formal endorsement does not necessarily translate into a lack of practical alignment. Although Nepal has not joined the GSI, elements of China’s domestic security governance model, particularly its emphasis on preventive policing, extensive technological surveillance, and state-centric control, are increasingly visible in Nepal. At the same time, China’s strategic engagements with Nepal are significantly shaped by concerns related to monitoring Tibetan communities, preventing anti-China activities, and counterbalancing India’s influence in the region.

One of the manifestations of China’s domestic security approach in Nepal is the expansion of Chinese-built surveillance infrastructure. Since 2016, Kathmandu has witnessed the steady installation of CCTV cameras under initiatives such as the “Safe City Project.” Today, surveillance infrastructure has expanded dramatically, with cameras installed at traffic intersections, public squares, religious sites, and even border regions. A substantial share of these systems is supplied by Chinese firms such as Hikvision, Dahua, and Uniview, which offer integrated features including night vision, facial recognition, and AI-enabled tracking.

While security and intelligence concerns have been raised globally regarding the integration of Chinese surveillance technology into the security agencies of foreign countries, developing countries like Nepal continue to rely on these systems largely out of necessity. Cost considerations play a significant role in this alignment, as Chinese technologies are more affordable than Western alternatives. In some instances, the Chinese government has also provided these technologies through grants or soft loans. However, this reliance creates a risk of technological lock-in, potentially binding Nepal’s security infrastructure to Chinese systems and limiting its strategic and technological autonomy in the long term.

Beyond this, China has also intensified its cooperation with Nepal’s security agencies through joint exercises, capacity-building initiatives, and equipment and infrastructure support. While the GSI serves as China’s overarching global security vision, the 2017 white paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (APSC) serves as a foundational regional framework. Its fifth pillar emphasizes intensified military exchanges and cooperation. This is evident in the Sagarmatha Friendship annual joint military exercise between the Nepal Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); China’s cooperation with the Armed Police Force (APF) on border security; and its expanding engagement with both the APF and the Nepal Police through training programs, study visits, government-funded scholarships, and the provision of equipment and infrastructure support. Collectively, these engagements facilitate institutional interoperability while gradually transferring operational norms and practices.

In this context, the impact of China’s security footprint in Nepal is not visible in formal statements or official endorsements, but in the gradual deepening of security practices and cooperation on the ground. In Nepal’s case, this represents a subtle yet significant shift. The adoption of elements of China’s security model does not imply the endorsement of any initiative, nor does it signal a departure from Nepal’s democratic commitments. Over time, however, the routine use of such practices and institutional engagements can have spillover effects, influencing institutional habits and surveillance among citizens.

These concerns are further heightened by the absence of a comprehensive data protection law in Nepal. Nepal should therefore strengthen and expand its data protection framework to comprehensively regulate surveillance technologies, data storage, access, and cross-border data sharing. In the absence of clear legal safeguards, and given China’s National Intelligence Law, which requires companies to provide information and data to support national intelligence efforts, the collection and management of data from Nepal remains on legally ambiguous grounds. Nepal’s challenge, therefore, is not whether to engage, but how to ensure that such engagements remain aligned with its constitutional principles and democratic norms.